External debt, trade and FDI on economic growth of least developed countries by Wamboye, Evelyn
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
External debt, trade and FDI on
economic growth of least developed
countries
Evelyn Wamboye
Pennsylvania State University
23. May 2012
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/39031/
MPRA Paper No. 39031, posted 26. May 2012 23:56 UTC
External Debt, Trade and FDI on Economic Growth of Least Developed 
Countries 
 
Evelyn Wamboye 
Business Department 
Pennsylvania State University 
DuBois, PA 15801 USA 
Email: efw10@psu.edu 
Tel: (814) 375 4856. Fax: (814) 375 4784 
 
 May 23, 2012  
ABSTRACT 
This study evaluates the impact of public external debt on long term economic growth of 
forty least developed countries (LDCs).  Arellano-Bond SGMM method is used on 
unbalanced panel data spanning from 1975 to 2010. A comparative analysis based on 
different debt specifications and samples is provided. Overall, our findings suggest that 
high external debt depresses economic growth, regardless of the nature of the debt. 
Furthermore, debt relief initiatives are crucial as evidenced in the lower negative debt 
effects on growth in HIPCs sub-sample relative to non-HIPCs. Additionally, trade, initial 
values of FDI and ODA matter in economic growth of LDCs.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Twelve percent of the world population lives in least developed countries (LDCs) and 
half of that population still face extreme poverty. These countries produce less than 2% of 
world gross domestic product (GDP) and account for less than 1% of global trade in goods. 
They are characterized by low levels of per capita income, high population growth rates, 
low domestic savings and investment and a limited and undiversified tax base (UN, 2011)1.  
Of the 48 LDCs, 33 are in Africa, 14 in Asia and pacific and one in Latin America. 29 of the 
LDCs are classified as heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs), of which, all, with the 
exception of Afghanistan, are found in Africa.  
The biggest constraint facing LDCs to achieve sustained and equitable economic growth 
and development is lack of domestic financial resources. As a result, many LDCs rely 
heavily on external capitals such as foreign direct investment, foreign aid, concessional 
lending and remittances.  One consequent of this foreign capital dependency has been an 
accumulation of a high external debt.   Despite the fact that 60% of the LDCs have either 
benefited or are working towards benefiting from the debt relief under the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) initiative and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) 
and other bilateral donors, they are still struggling with high debt burdens. Specifically, 
debt servicing still continues to heavily constraint their already scarce budgetary 
resources, posing a big challenging in achieving the United Nation’s 2011-2020 overarching 
goal of the Programme of Action2 (UN, 2011).  
Although there are substantial studies on debt-growth relationship, most of them have 
focused largely on advanced and emerging nations (Kumar and Woo, 2010; Reinhart and 
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Rogoff, 2010), with a few on low income and developing countries (Pattillo, Poirson and 
Ricci, 2011; Clements, Bhattacharya and Nguyen, 2003). Literature devoted specifically on 
least developed countries as a group is scant. Because of the differences in economic 
structure, policy formulation environment and access to capital markets between least 
developed countries and industrialized or emerging nations, the impact and the channel 
through which external debt affects economic growth may vary. Therefore, one has to be 
cautious when drawing inferences, especially on least developed countries using evidence 
based on emerging or industrialized nations studies.  
This study contributes to the literature on external debt – growth nexus for least 
developed countries in three ways. First we evaluate the impact of public and publicly 
guaranteed (PPG) external debt on long term economic growth of least developed 
countries within the context of HIPCs and MDR debt relief Initiatives.  Theory and empirical 
studies suggest that external debt effects are transmitted to economic growth through 
capital accumulation and total factor productivity (Pattillo, Poirson and Ricci, 2004). The 
capital accumulation transmission mechanism is explained through the debt overhang 
hypothesis and has been the main focus of the studies on low income and developing 
countries. Accordingly, this study assesses the impact of external debt through the debt 
overhang hypothesis.  Data used for empirical analysis spans from 1975 to 2010, providing 
sufficient time span to observe and empirically assess the impact of HIPCs and MDR debt 
relief Initiatives in the beneficiary countries. Second, our empirical model, unlike other 
related studies (such as Clements et. al, 2003), controls for the effects of foreign capital 
(FDI and ODA), both of which are considered to be crucial in the long term economic 
4 
 
growth of least developed countries. Finally, we seek to stimulate the debate on the 
effectiveness of different forms of external debt on long term economic growth by using 
different specification of external debt stocks in addition to PPG, namely total and 
concessional debts.   
Our empirical approach builds on the works of Kumar and Woo (2010) and Clements 
et.al (2003).We follow closely the findings of Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (2004) 
in selecting the core sets of growth determinants that have been established to have higher 
posterior inclusion probability; however, the estimated model variables are constrained by 
the available data. We control for the effects of foreign capitals, domestic capital, human 
capital, population growth and fiscal volatility.  Issues of endogeneity, simultaneity and 
reverse causality, measurement bias and nonlinearity are addressed. We employ Arellano-
Bond system Generalized Methods of Moments (SGMM) as the primary estimation 
technique, however, we also report results based on fixed effects method for robust checks. 
Results from this study are crucial in shedding some light on whether the HIPCs and MDR 
and other debt forgiveness initiatives from bilateral donors have had any impact on the 
recently observed positive growth rates in LDCs. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows; section II discusses the relevant literature, 
section III provides a descriptive analysis of trends in external debt, investment and 
macroeconomic performance, section IV, methodology and results and section V concludes. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A number of approaches have been explored in literature to explain the debt-growth 
linkage. Regardless of the approach used, the general consensus is that an increasing 
external debt is detrimental to economic growth. Furthermore, debt effects are transmitted 
(directly or indirectly) to economic growth through capital resources accumulation 
(physical and human capital). The major distinguishing factor among these approaches is 
how the debt affects are modeled in the growth equation. The most common ways are 
either debt stock or debt services.  
There are two major approaches used in literature related to low income and 
developing countries. The “debt overhang hypothesis” and the “crowding out effects” [also 
referred to as Liquidity constraint in Moss and Chiang, 2003]. Krugman (1988) defined 
debt overhang as a situation in which a country’s expected repayment on external debt falls 
below the contractual value of the debt. Under this scenario, the expected debt service is 
likely to be an increasing function of the country’s gross domestic product. The presence of 
a debt overhang has a dampening effect on a country’s long term investment and factor 
productivity and hence economic growth. For example, if potential investors believe that 
the government with a large debt will engage in distortionary fiscal policy (tax increase or 
seigniorage tax) or other distortionary measures such as currency devaluation in order to 
service the debt, they will lower their expectations on return to their investments.  As a 
result, they will cut back on investment spending and holdings of their savings in the local 
currency, slowing capital stock accumulation. Uncertainty literature argues that 
expectation of such distortionary practices cause (risk averse) investors to shy away from 
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high risk long term productive investments (such as foreign direct investment) in favor of 
short term unproductive investments (Serven, 1997). The debt overhang effects are usually 
measured using either the face value or the net present value of the debt stock, expressed 
either as a percentage of gross domestic product or exports.  
A large external debt can also affect growth through the crowding out effect or by 
affecting the composition of private investment (Clements et.al, 2003). An increasing debt 
service may increase the government’s interest bill and the budget deficit and 
consequently, cause the long term interest rate to rise or simply crowd out credit available 
for private investment (Gale and Orzag, 2003; Baldacci and Kumar, 2010). Also, as the debt 
service heightens, the government is likely to cut back its funding for public investment in 
infrastructure, human capital and research and innovations (Agenor and Montiel, 1996; 
Calvo, 1998). This has both direct and indirect effects on growth by lowering the quantity 
of public investment and factor productivity. Infrastructure, innovations and capital 
resources, in addition to sound institutions and good policies have been known historically 
as the key ingredients for long term economic growth. Therefore, anything that negatively 
affects these factors, negatively impacts a country’s long term growth. Studies that have 
incorporated the crowding out effects in the growth equation have measured debt effects 
using external debt service as a share of exports. 
Empirical evidence on both the debt overhang and crowding out effects are mixed. 
Table A summarizes the relevant studies. While there is relatively more evidence in 
support of the debt overhang hypothesis, evidence on crowding out effects is very limited. 
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Also, it is clear that there is limited evidence on the debt-growth link for least developed 
countries as a group. This study fills in that gap.  
Table A about here 
Other issues that have received attention on the debt-growth debate have been the 
non-linearity of the debt effects and the debt threshold levels. The debt threshold level 
determines the turning point, beyond which additional debt impacts economic growth 
negatively. Most recent studies on the debt-growth nexus have either by default specified 
the debt variable in a quadratic form or provided empirical rationale for the quadratic 
specification. Pattillo et.al (2011) for example, estimated a growth equation using both 
linear and non-linear specifications and found that in the linear case, the debt stock 
measure tended to be negative and significant. However, when a quadratic specification 
was used, they found evidence of inverted U-relationship, supporting the theoretical 
predications. Conceptually, reasonable levels of debt can be growth enhancing within the 
Keynesian framework. However, as the debt grows bigger, effects stemming from debt 
overhang and other channels can have long run deleterious impact on the economy.  
Several studies have attempted to estimate the threshold levels or turning points. 
These turning points tend to vary across samples (based on income level) and within 
samples (depending on whether a group of countries have good or bad policies). 
Empirically estimated threshold levels (using debt stock as a share of GDP) have ranged 
from as low as 11% (in Pattillo et al., 2011) to as high as 97 %( in Elbadawi, Ndulu and 
Ndung’u, 1997). Cordella, Ricci and Ruiz-Arranz (2005) using data of 80 developing 
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countries (with 30 HIPCs) found that the marginal effects of debt become irrelevant at debt 
stock level of 70-80% of GDP. Nonetheless, as indicated in Pattillo et.al (2011), these 
turning point estimates are not robust to model specification, sample and estimation 
methodologies. In this study we do not attempt to estimate the threshold level values.  
 
III. EXTERNAL DEBT INVESTMENT AND MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE  
In this section we provide a descriptive analysis of external debt, Investment (domestic 
and foreign) and the macroeconomic performance of least developed countries (LDCs). As 
documented in the preceding section, a large external debt can negatively influence 
potential investors when determining both the location of their foreign investments and 
the type of investment.  For example, if investors expect that a government with a large 
external debt will engage in distortionary and unpredictable fiscal policies in order to 
service their external debt, they will lower expectations of the returns on their 
investments. This in turn will limit the country’s foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, 
encourage non-productive short term investments and discourage existing firms from 
making new investments and/or engaging in research and innovations.  
Consequently, in addition to analyzing the trends in the entire sample, we also compare 
the performance in the HIPCs and non-HIPCs sub-samples. The HIPCs sub-sample consists 
of 27 LDCs categorized by International Monetary fund as Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPCs) and either have benefited or are working towards benefiting from the HIPCs and 
MDR debt relief initiatives. Non- HIPCs sub-sample are the remaining 13 LDCs that do not 
fall in the IMF’s HIPCs classification. Overall, based on our sample period, non-HIPCs tend 
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to have a lower debt stock, a higher share of FDI in GDP and relatively higher growth rates, 
almost 6 times that of HIPCs (table B).  
Table B about here 
3.1. Trends in External Debt 
Eighty percent of LDCs total external debt is public and publicly guaranteed (PPG). Also 
approximately 79.6% of the total external debt is long term, implying that majority of LDCs 
debt is official and also tends to be long term in nature. With the exception of a few 
outliers3, the average external PPG debt across the countries in our sample lies between 
50% and 150% of GDP (figure 1.A).  
Figure 1.A about here 
Relative to low income and sub-Saharan African countries (of which comparative 
data was available), LDCs have the highest overall PPG as a share of GDP. Time series 
trends however indicate that external debt stock as a share of GDP has been declining since 
1994; across various income groups (figure 1.B) and debt categories (figure 1.C). Because 
majority of countries in the Low income category and in sub-Saharan Africa are also 
categorized as HIPCs, the observed decline might be due to the HIPCs and MDR debt relief 
initiatives.  
Figure 1.B and 1.C about here 
Figure 2 provides information on the disaggregated data between HIPCs and non-
HIPCs sub-samples. As can be seen, a large proportion of the LDCs debt is due to the HIPCs 
sub-sample. Nonetheless, we observe a steady decline in the debt stock as a percentage of 
GDP in both groups since 1994 (this decline is also observed even when the debt stock is 
measured as a share of exports). Interestingly, these movements coincide with the onset of 
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the debt relief initiatives that were initiated in 1996 by International Monetary Fund and 
World Bank.  
Figure 2 about here 
3.2.  Trends in Investment  
In line with the declining external debt stock (as observed in the preceding section), we 
expect to observe an increasing share of investment (domestic and foreign) in LDCs’ GDP 
for two reasons: (i) signaling investor’s confidence in the improving fiscal policy 
environment as a result of the lower debt burden; (ii) due to improving private investment 
complementarities such as infrastructure and human capital. In particular, private 
investment is likely to increase if the government is channeling its additional budget 
resources towards for example, investment in infrastructure and human resources 
(Clements et.al, 2003).  
Figure 3.A about here 
Figure 3.A provides a summary of the trends in FDI and gross fixed capital 
formation (K) as shares of GDP in LDCs. It is evident that both K (proxy for domestic 
investment) and FDI have been on the upward trend since 1996, with K taking the largest 
proportion (above 20% of GDP since 2004). Furthermore, K’s share in GDP has been 
consistently above that of overseas development assistance (ODA) since 1995. 
Nonetheless, when the data is disaggregated, we notice that the rising LDCs’ trends 
in K and FDI are stemming from both sub-samples (HIPCs and non-HIPCs) (figure 3.B). The 
gap between HIPCs and non-HIPCs in domestic investment (K) has been narrowing, leading 
to the observed convergence in 2009. Thanks to the downward trend in non-HIPCs (since 
1996) and the upward trend in HIPCs (since 1997). Conversely, the share of FDI has 
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consistently fluctuated below 5% of GDP in both HIPCs and non-HIPCs and HIPCs, with an 
increasing trend in HIPCs since 1996. 
Figure 3.B about here 
Overall, the share of FDI inflows as a percentage of the world FDI flows averaged 
0.8%, 0.6% and 0.9% in LDCs, low income countries and heavily indebted poor countries 
respectively, between 1975 and 2010. Moreover, there was a sharp decline in the flow of 
FDI in these three groups between 1976 and 1996, which recuperated in 1997 (figure 3.C). 
Relative to low income countries, heavily indebted poor countries and LDCs have been 
attracting more FDI, with the shares fluctuating between 0.5% and 1.5% of World FDI 
flows.  
Figure 3.C about here 
 
3.3. Trends in Macroeconomic Performance 
LDCs are on average net importers. The share of trade in goods and services averaged 
64% of GDP between 1975 and 2010 with the ten year averages indicating the increasing 
importance of trade in the domestic economy. Besides, the share of imports is almost two 
times that of exports (table C). Overseas development assistance (ODA), a major source of 
development funds in least developed countries ranges between 12% and 15% of GDP in 
these countries.  
Table C about here 
Economic growth on the other hand, has been growing at a modest rate since 1992, 
with the peak rates ranging between 3.5% and 3.6% (figure 4.A). Disaggregating the data 
into HIPCs and non-HIPCs sub-samples, provide interesting results. It is apparent that the 
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growth rate in the non-HIPCs sub-sample has been relatively higher, with pronounced 
volatilities, relative to the HIPCs sub-sample (figure 4.B). 
Figure 4.A and 4.B about here 
 
IV. METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
 
4.1. Empirical Model 
In the formal analysis, we investigate the effects of external debt on economic growth of 
forty least developed countries4 using unbalanced panel data for the period of 1975 to 
2010. Primarily, we focus on external public and publicly guaranteed debt since it 
constitutes the bulk of LDCs external debt. Nonetheless, we also evaluate the effects of 
external total debt and concessional debt.  In order to capture the debt overhang effects, 
the debt stocks are expressed as percentages of both GDP and exports. We follow closely 
the findings of Sala-i-Martin et al (2004) in selecting the core sets of growth determinants, 
however, the estimated model variables are constrained by the available data. Among the 
core set of variables included in this paper that were identified by Sala-i-Martin et al (2004) 
to have high marginal contribution to the explanatory power of the growth regression are 
human capital measure, trade openness, general government consumption share, 
population growth and regional dummies.  
We employ some of the model specification approach used in Kumar and Woo (2010) 
and Clements et.al (2003). For example, in addition to the panel regressions based on the 
annual data, we also use 3-year averaged data of the dependent variable and initial values 
(at the beginning of each time period) of the independent variables (with the exception of 
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human capital and fiscal volatility measures, of which the 3-year average values are used). 
This gives us 12 non-overlapping periods from 1975 to 2010. Regressions based on the 
averaged dependent variable control for the effects of short run cyclical fluctuations and 
minimize the effects of outliers. Furthermore, by using initial level of debt, we are able to 
control for the reverse causality bias.  
Some studies have suggested that there exists a Laffer-curve between debt and growth 
(Pattilo et.al, 2011; Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano, 2003; Presbitero, 2008; Clements et.al, 
2003; Cordella et.al, 2005), therefore, this study also explores the non-linearity effects. 
Needless to mention, empirical results on non-linear specification are not robust to model 
specification, estimation technique and sample used.  
We also address a number of methodology issues. The endogeneity bias may arise due 
to the potential endogeneity of growth determinants, for example, debt, investment and 
human capital variables. On the other hand, there is a possibility that low growth may 
cause high debts, while high debts may cause low growth or that both debt and growth 
maybe jointly determined by a third variable. In such instances, the model will suffer from 
reverse causality and simultaneity bias.  Other biases that may affect the consistency of the 
estimates include the heterogeneity (omitted variable) bias and the measurement error (in 
independent variables).   
System GMM (SGMM) approach of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998) is used to control for the endogeneity bias, measurement bias, unobserved country 
fixed effects and other potentially omitted variables. Relative to the difference GMM, SGMM 
is robust to weak instrument bias. It uses suitable lagged levels and lagged first differences 
of the regressors as their instruments. For robust checks and minimizing the effects of 
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biases, we also report results based on fixed effects (FE) estimation technique.  FE is used 
to control for the effects of omitted variable bias, which arises from the correlation 
between country specific effects and the regressors. Nevertheless, the consistency of the FE 
estimates is affected by endogeneity bias and measurement error.  
In the empirical model we identify three categories of variables that affect economic 
growth in addition to external debt; 1) Global factors, 2) domestic factors and, 3) dummy 
variables. Each of the categories is discussed below. 
Starting in the early 1980s, developing countries experienced a wave of macroeconomic 
policy shifts away from import protection, managed exchange rates and targeted subsidies 
towards trade, investment and financial market liberalization.  The objectives of the policy 
shift were believed, among other factors, to positively affect a country’s economic growth 
by increasing the competitiveness and efficiency of the export sector and overall improving 
the production efficiency in the domestic market. In addition, long term private 
international capital flows have been viewed as complementary and catalytic agents in 
building and strengthening domestic factor productivity with inherent tangible and 
intangible benefits such as contributing to export-led growth, technology and skill transfer 
and employment creation. Consequently we expect global factors such as trade openness 
and foreign direct investment (FDI) to positively enhance economic growth.  
FDI is measured as a percentage of GDP. Because trade openness is a policy outcome, a 
better proxy would include a policy instrument such as data on tariff or other non-tariff 
barriers. However, we do not have comprehensive data on these policy instruments and 
therefore as proxies, we use policy outcome variables. Relative to the existing studies that 
use volume of trade as a measure of trade openness, we use net exports by entering 
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separately into our model imports and exports (as percentage of GDP). We are motivated to 
enter imports and exports as separate arguments for two reasons. First, by measuring the 
net exports, we are able to observe the effects of the global demand on economic growth. 
Second, as indicated in the preceding section, countries in our sample are net importers, 
with their export sector characterized by primary commodities and agriculture based light 
manufacturing, which are income inelastic and price elastic.  It is expected for FDI to have a 
positive effect while net exports, negative effects.  
Another global factor included in our model is the share of net official development 
assistance (ODA) in gross national income. The biggest constraint facing LDCs to achieving 
sustainable economic growth is mobilizing domestic financial resources for development. 
As a result, majority of them are faced with a big financing gap. Consequently, ODA remains 
the largest source of development funds in most LDCs and has been advocated by United 
Nations General Assembly as a necessary financial source to help these countries graduate 
from the LDC status. It has also been indicated in literature that debt overhang effects are 
exacerbated in the presences of low ODA flow (Pattillo, Poirson and Ricci, 2004). The sign 
for ODA is expected to be positive. 
Sala-i-Martin et al (2004) identified human capital measure, population growth and 
government consumption expenditure as some of the variables that have high marginal 
contribution to explanatory power of the growth regression.  These variables make up the 
domestic factors in addition to physical capital. According to UNFPA (2011), least 
developed countries have the highest population growth rate in the world, which is three 
times that of other developing countries.  Population growth has also been used elsewhere 
as a proxy for the rate of growth of labor input in the production process.  We expect 
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population growth rate variable to have negative effects on economic growth. Secondary 
school enrolment and the share of gross fixed capital formation in GDP are used as proxies 
for quality of human capital and physical capital respectively. According to Grossman and 
Helpman (1991), a country with high human capital is more likely to attract investors, have 
the capacity to absorb new ideas and engage in research and innovations. We expect both 
human capital and physical capital to have positive effects on growth.  
As a fiscal policy instrument, government consumption expenditure can be used during 
economic downturns to stimulated aggregate demand and output though the Keynesian 
effect. However, if the spending is politically motivated or is as a result of corruption, it 
could have negative consequences on the medium and long run economic growth. 
Accordingly, this study deviates from the conventional use of government consumption 
expenditure directly into the regression equation and use, instead, deviations of the share 
of general government consumption expenditure in GDP from its trend. This specification 
allows us to observe the potential negative effects of fiscal volatility on economic growth5.  
In addition to the global and domestic variables, we include dummy variables for 
landlocked countries and Asian countries. To capture the effects of HIPC and MDR 
initiatives, we use a dummy variable for the HIPC and MDR initiatives beneficiaries in the 
baseline regression (however, we also use an interaction term between the HIPC dummy 
and the debt variable in the FE estimations).  The lag of log per capita real GDP is included 
in line with the standard Barro (1991) growth model, to test for convergence across 
countries over time towards a common level of real per capita income.  
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Consequently, the baseline regression specification is based on equations (1) below.  
2
0 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9 10 11
it it it it it it it it
it it it it it
RPYG RPY PPG PPG FDI ODA SS Fiscal
K Popg Integration dummies
β β β β β β β β
β β β β ε
−= + + + + + + + +
+ + + +
  
  (1) 
Where: RPYG and RPYt-1 are the real per capita GDP growth and the lag of real per capita 
GDP (expressed in log) respectively, in country i at time t.  0β  is the common intercept and 
itε  is the error term. PPG and PPG2 is the external public and publicly guaranteed debt 
expressed as a percentage of both GDP and exports and its quadratic form (in other 
specifications, we use external total and concessional debts6). FDI is the net inflow of 
foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP. ODA is the net overseas development 
assistance received as a percentage of gross national income.  Integration comprises those 
variables that capture the global economic integration; exports and imports as shares of 
GDP. SS is the secondary school enrolment (as percentage of gross). Popg is population 
growth rate. Fiscal is the fiscal volatility, which is measured as the deviation of the share of 
general government consumption expenditure in GDP from its trend. Dummies are the 
dummy variables for landlocked countries, Asia and HIPC7 (in FE estimations we use an 
interaction between the debt and the dummy variables).  
 
4.2. Data and Econometric Results 
All the data are downloaded from World Bank’s World Development indicators (2012) 
website. Variable description and notation explanation is detailed in table D. Descriptive 
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Statistics and correlation matrix of all the variables used in our model are provided in 
Tables 1 and 2 respectively.   A list of countries used in the sample can be found in table E.  
In the baseline regression, we evaluate the effects of external public and publicly 
guaranteed debt on economic growth of 40 least developed countries. We use annual data 
for the period of 1975 to 2010. In order to further isolate the effects of HIPCs and MDR debt 
relief initiatives, we disaggregate the data into two sub-samples: HIPCs and non-HIPCs. The 
HIPCs sub-sample consists of those countries categorized by IMF as heavily indebted poor 
countries and have either benefited or are working towards benefiting from the debt relief 
initiatives. Non-HIPCs sub-sample includes those LDCs that do not fall in the heavily 
indebted poor countries category. We report the results based on the full sample and sub-
samples. Due to potential endogeneity bias and other biases mentioned above, we follow 
what has been used elsewhere in literature and use Arellano- Bond SGMM approach.  In 
accordance with GMM estimation techniques, Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions 
and the Arellano-Bond test that the average autocovariance of residuals of order two is 
zero are also reported.  
For robust checks and to control for reverse causality bias and short run cyclical 
fluctuations, we estimate equation (1) using 3-year averaged data of the dependent 
variable.  Additionally, to ensure that our results are robust to estimation techniques, we 
report results based on fixed effects (FE) methodology. Table 3 (A and B) contains baseline 
regression results using SGMM. Table 4 (A and B) reports FE estimation output. 
Consistency check regressions using averaged data are reported in table 5.  
The SGMM results pass the Sargan test for validity of the instruments and the Arellano 
bond test of average autocovariance of residuals. We also conduct the Hausman test, which 
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rejects the random effect in favor of fixed effects. Generally, the baseline estimations based 
on SGMM and FE (tables 3 and 4) provide consistent results for the debt variables and most 
of the other growth determinants. Table 3 and 4 reports results based on the full sample 
(40 LDCs) and the two sub-samples (HIPCs and non-HIPCs). We augment the public and 
publicly guaranteed external debt stock results with those using external total and 
concessional debt stocks.  
In both tables 3 and 4, the conditional convergence variable is significant, with the right 
sign. We find evidence of non-linear relationship between external debt and economic 
growth.  Specifically, we find a U-shaped relationship, which is robust across the different 
debt specifications, samples and in both SGMM and FE estimation techniques. Nevertheless, 
the positive marginal effects are diminishing. While these results are in line with the 
conclusion arrived in Cordella et.al (2005), they are contrary to other related studies 
(Pattillo et. al, 2011; Clements et.al, 2003) that found an inverted-U relationship between 
debt and economic growth. There are two plausible explanations to the findings in this 
study. First, studies that found an inverted-U relationship used initial debt stocks, which 
they regressed on either 3-year or 5-year averages of real per capita GDP growth. In this 
study however, our baseline regressions use annual panel data. Besides, we also find 
evidence in support of an inverted-U relationship when we regress initial debt values on 3-
year averaged growth variable (see table 5). Second, the average total debt in our sample is 
90% and 448% of GDP and exports respectively compared, for example in Pattillo et. al 
(2011), which is about 68.32% and 288.75% of GDP and exports respectively. 
Consequently, it is possible that LDCs’ debt is relatively too high (above the “threshold 
level”) such that, doubling the debt can only have positive marginal effects.  
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In evaluating the debt stock effects across the different samples, we notice that the 
negative effects are more pronounced in the non-HIPCs sub-sample relative to the HIPCs, 
regardless of the estimation technique and debt specification (table 3 and4). Also we notice 
that the concessional debt has higher negative effects on economic growth relative to 
public and publicly guaranteed debt.  The rest of the results analysis focuses on the 
estimations based on SGMM in table 3. In table 3A the debt stock is measured as a 
percentage of GDP, while in table 3B, as a percentage of exports. 
In addition to the debt effects, we included other growth determinants, categorized as; 
domestic, global and dummy variables. The domestic variables include both human and 
physical capital, population growth and fiscal volatility measure. Overall, we find that 
population growth and domestic capital variables have the expected sign where significant. 
Human capital measure also tends to be significant with a positive sign. The positive effects 
are more pronounced in the HIPCs sub-sample. The fiscal volatility variable, which is 
measured as the deviations of general government consumption expenditure from its 
trend, is significant in the full sample, with the expected sign. When we disaggregate the 
data, we find that the negative effects are stemming from the non-HIPCs sub-sample (see 
table 3).  
FDI, ODA and a measure of trade openness comprise the global variables. As seen in 
table 3, FDI has neutral effects on economic grow of LDCs. ODA on the other hand, has 
meaningful significant and positive effects in the non-HIPCs sub-sample but neutral in the 
full sample and HIPCs sub-sample. These findings are robust across all the debt 
specifications. In reference to growth effects from trade openness, we deviate from the 
norm and enter separately into our equation, exports and imports (as a % of GDP) rather 
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than use trade volume. This allows us to measure the effects of net exports (or global 
demand) on the domestic economic growth. Studies that have used trade as a share of GDP 
have found insignificant effects of trade openness. However, in this study we find that the 
effects of net exports tend to be significant and positive, across all samples and estimation 
techniques (including the 3-year averaged data). Moreover, these effects are more 
pronounced in the HIPCs sub-sample.   
In the dummy variable category, we include a dummy for landlocked economies, Asia 
and HIPCs. The HIPCs dummy is intended to capture the effects of the IMF/World Bank 
debt relief initiatives.  A dummy variable for Africa is not included since majority (85%) of 
the LDCs in Africa are also classified as HIPCs. Furthermore, when both the Africa and Asia 
dummies are included in the regression, one of them is dropped due to collinearity. The 
dummies for landlocked and Asia tend to be significant with a positive sign. The HIPC 
dummy is neutral in all cases with only one exception (where total debt is measured as a 
share of exports, table 3B).   
Table 5 details the results of the effects of initial debt on the subsequent growth rates 
averaged over a 3-year period. Due to the overall sample size, we do not disaggregate this 
data into the two sub samples mentioned in the preceding analysis. However we 
supplement the results based on the public and publicly guaranteed external debt stock 
with those of total external debt stock and concessional debt stock. There are some 
interesting findings in this table worthy of attention. First these results support the Laffer 
curve relationship between initial debt and subsequent growth that has been observed in 
other related studies. Second, initial FDI flows have significant positive effects on 
subsequent growth, especially when debt is measured as a percentage of GDP. Third, ODA 
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has significant negative effects on growth in the presence of public and publicly guaranteed 
debt and concessional debt but neutral when total debt is used. Fourth, human capital 
measure is significant with a negative sign in all debt specifications. Lastly, we do not 
observe the conditional convergence that was observed in tables 3 and 4 and in other 
related studies (such as Pattillo et. al., 2011; Clements et. al., 2003). 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
This study evaluates the impact of public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) external debt 
on long term economic growth of forty least developed countries using the debt overhang 
hypothesis. In addition to the PPG debt effects, we also provide comparative results based 
on total external debt and concessional debt. Data used in this study spans from 1975 to 
2010, providing sufficient time span to observe and empirically assess the impact of 
IMF/World Bank debt relief that was initiated in 1996 under the heavily indebted poor 
countries (HIPCs) and multilateral debt relief (MDR) initiatives. We control for the effects 
of foreign capitals, domestic capitals, fiscal volatility and other growth determinants 
established in Sala-i-Martin et. al (2004). Arellano-Bond SGMM estimation technique is 
used to control for endogeneity bias, measurement error bias, unobserved country fixed 
effects and other potential omitted variables bias. For robust checks, we also report results 
based on fixed effects estimation technique. Additionally, we report results based on two 
sub-samples; HIPCs and non-HIPCs. To net out the short run cyclical fluctuations and to 
control for reverse causality bias, regressions based on 3-year averaged real per capital 
growth data are also reported.  
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In summary, our findings suggest that high external debt depresses economic growth of 
least developed countries, regardless of the nature of the debt (public and publicly 
guaranteed debt, total or concessional). These effects are positive and diminishing when 
debt is doubled. Nonetheless, concessional debt has higher negative effects on economic 
growth of LDCs relative to public and publicly guaranteed debt. In the disaggregated data 
however, we learn that the negative debt effects are more pronounced in the non-HIPCs 
sub-sample relative to the HIPCs, suggesting potential beneficial effects from the debt relief 
initiatives.  
When we examine the effects of trade openness using net exports, we find that trade is 
benefitting LDCs despite the fact that they are net importers. These beneficial effects are 
more pronounced in HIPCs sub-sample. For example, a 10 percentage point increase in net 
exports leads to approximately 2.77% increase in economic growth of HIPCs and only 
about 2.1% in non-HIPCs. FDI on the other hand does not have any apparent meaningful 
effects on economic growth of LDCs. Nonetheless, ODA has some meaningful growth 
enhancing effects only in the non-HIPCs sub-sample.  
Domestic factors such as physical and human capitals also matter in economic growth 
of LDCs. They both tend to have growth enhancing effects. When data is disaggregated 
however, we find the observed positive effects of physical capital in the full sample are 
solely stemming from the non-HIPCs. An increase in population growth rate and fiscal 
volatility in these countries is detrimental on growth. 
Overall, this study found that the Laffer curve relationship between debt and economic 
growth is apparent when initial debt is regressed on averaged growth data. When annual 
values are used, we found that there existed a U-shaped relationship. Furthermore the debt 
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relief initiatives are crucial as evidenced in the lower negative debt effects on growth in 
HIPCs sub-sample relative to the non-HIPCs. Additionally, initial values of FDI and ODA 
matter in economic growth of LDCs. Nonetheless further investigations are required to 
establish the effects of debt on FDI and domestic investment in HIPCs. This will shed some 
light on whether the negative effects of debt are transmitted to economic growth via these 
two forms of investment.  Clements et al (2003) found that in low income countries, debt 
service depresses public investment and concluded that it is public investment and not 
private investment that matters to growth in those countries.  
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Appendix I: Tables 
Table A: 
Table A: Summary of Related Studies 
 
Study Sample Evidence in support of Debt overhang 
and/or Crowding out effects 
Pattillo et.al (2011) 93 developing countries 
for the period of 1968-
1998. 
 
Found evidence supporting debt 
overhang. None on crowding out effects. 
Clements et.al 
(2003) 
55 low income countries Results support debt overhang. Did not 
find direct effects of debt service 
(crowding out effects) on growth.  
Chowdhury (2001) 35 HIPCs and 25 non-
HIPCs. Sample period 
1982-89 
Found evidence supporting debt 
overhang. 
Fosu (1999) 35 sub-Saharan African 
countries 
 Found evidence in support of the debt 
overhang but none on crowding out 
effects. 
Elbadawi, Ndulu 
and Ndung’u 
(1997) 
sub-Saharan African 
countries 
Found evidence in support of the debt 
overhang and crowding out effects.  
Deshpande (1997) 13 severely indebted 
countries.  
Found evidence in support of debt 
overhang. 
 
Table B: 
Table B: Selected Summary Statistics for HIPCs and non-HIPCs sub-
samples, 1975 -2010 
 
  
LDCs - 
All 
LDCs - 
HIPCs 
LDCs-non-
HIPCs 
Real per capital GDP growth 
rate 0.841 0.379 2.312 
FDI (% of GDP) 89.044 2.454 57.305 
Total Debt (% of GNI) 2.860 98.321 3.777 
PPG Debt (% of GDP) 71.462 77.733 49.641 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2012.  
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Table C: 
Table C: LDCs Share of Trade (Exports and Imports) as a % 
of  GDP 
 
 
1975 - 
2010 
1975-
1984 
1985-
1994 
1995-
2004 
2005-
2010 
Trade 63.599 58.726 57.882 64.893 76.866 
Imports 39.613 37.201 36.685 40.047 46.609 
Exports 24.008 21.525 21.197 24.911 30.257 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2012 
Table D: 
Table D: Variable Description and Notations 
 
Variable Description Notation 
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) RPY 
GDP per capita growth (annual %) RPYG 
External debt stocks, long-term public sector (DOD, current US$) (% of GDP) DEBTLY 
External debt stocks, long-term public sector (DOD, current US$) (% of 
EXPORTS) DEBTLX 
External debt stocks, public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) (DOD, current US$) 
(% GDP) PPGY 
External debt stocks, public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) (DOD, current US$) 
(% EXPORTS) PPGX 
External debt stocks, concessional (DOD, current US$) (% of GDP) DEBTCY 
External debt stocks, concessional (DOD, current US$) (% of EXPORTS) DEBTCX 
External debt stocks (% of exports of goods, services and income) DEBTX 
External debt stocks (% of GNI) DEBTY 
External debt stocks, short-term (DOD, current US$) (% of GDP) DEBTSY 
External debt stocks, short-term (DOD, current US$) (% of EXPORTS) DEBTSX 
General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) G 
Deviations of G from its trend FISCAL 
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) K 
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) M 
Net ODA received (% of GNI) ODA 
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) X 
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) FDI 
Population growth (annual %) popg 
School enrollment, secondary (% gross) SS 
Trade (% of GDP) Trade 
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Table E: 
Table E: Sample LDCs 
 
HIPCs (27) Non-HIPC (13) LDCs excluded in Sample (8) 
Benin Mauritania Angola Sao Tome and Principe 
Burkina Faso Mozambique Djibouti Afghanistan 
Burundi Niger Gambia, The Somalia 
Central African 
Republic Rwanda Lesotho Myanmar 
Chad Senegal Bangladesh Equatorial Guinea 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Sierra Leone Bhutan Kiribati 
Eritrea Sudan Cambodia Timor-Leste 
Ethiopia Tanzania Lao PDR Tuvalu 
Guinea Togo Nepal 
Guinea-Bissau Uganda Samoa 
Liberia Zambia Solomon Islands 
Madagascar Comoros Vanuatu 
Malawi Haiti Yemen, Rep. 
Mali 
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Appendix II: Figures 
Figure 1.A 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2012 
Figure 1.B 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2012 
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Figure 1.C 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2012 
 
Figure 2 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2012 
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Figure 3.A 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2012 
 
Figure 3.B 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2012 
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Figure 3.C 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2012 
 
Figure 4.A 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2012 
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Figure 4.B 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2012 
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Appendix II: Summary Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable  Mean 
Std. 
dev. Min Max Observations 
Real GDP Per capita Growth 0.841 6.621 -50.29 92.586 1243 
Log (GDP real GDP per capita) 5.726 0.620 4.057 7.540 1259 
PPD Debt (% GDP) 71.462 70.067 0.238 862.108 1271 
PPD Debt (% X) 417.497 518.519 1.442 6241.920 1207 
Total Debt (% GNI) 89.044 100.475 0.280 1022.742 1253 
Total Debt (% X) 454.240 560.921 7.653 4224.243 1090 
Concessional Debt (% of GDP) 52.855 47.556 0.238 472.720 1271 
Concessional Debt (% of X) 317.777 384.274 1.442 3958.324 1207 
Exports (% GDP) 24.008 14.828 2.525 89.624 1213 
Imports (% GDP) 39.613 22.544 6.341 190.864 1214 
FDI (% of GDP) 2.860 7.727 -82.89 90.741 1193 
ODA (% of GNI) 15.626 13.790 0.210 185.941 1269 
K (% of GDP) 18.748 9.873 1.931 76.693 1052 
Fiscal Volatility 0.000 9.819 -13.04 53.884 1133 
Secondary Schooling 20.179 14.833 1.635 96.566 929 
Pop Growth 2.585 1.211 -7.53 9.770 1440 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                      
1 United Nations, 2011. Report of the Fourth United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries. 
Istanbul, Turkey, 9-13 May, 2011. A/CONF.219/7 
2 The United Nations overarching goal of the Programme of Action for the decade 2011-2020 established 
during the 2011 United Nations conference on LDCs in Istanbul, Turkey is to overcome the structural 
challenges faced by the LDCs in order to eradicate poverty, achieve internationally agreed development goals 
and enable graduation from LDC category by 2020. 
3 Guinea (12), Guinea-Bissau (13), Lesotho (14) and Liberia (15). These countries have debt levels above 
150% of GDP.  
4 8 Countries were excluded due to inadequate data 
5 We conducted regressions using the share of general government consumption expenditure in GDP (G), the 
coefficient of G was statistically significant with a negative sign. However, when we included both G and fiscal 
volatility in the equation, the coefficient on fiscal volatility was significant and negative but that on G was 
positive and insignificant. When we excluded G and ran the regressions with fiscal volatility alone, the model 
was unaffected and therefore, we do not included G in our final regressions.  
6 We do not report results for long term  and short term debts because: (i) long term external debt is 
approximately equals to PPG debt and consequently when we ran regressions using the long term debt we 
found that the results were similar to that of PPG. (ii) Most of the results for short term debt were statistically 
insignificant and thus we do not report them. These results are available upon request.  
7 A dummy variable for Africa is excluded because most of the HIPC beneficiaries are Africa LDCs.  
